Reference
Compare descriptive, causal and direct-reference accounts of how names and terms pick out things in the world.
Subject
Purpose
Meaning and linguistic representation studied through reference, truth, use, speech acts, interpretation and the relation between language and thought.
Structure
Problem → positions → arguments → objections → implications
Philosophy of language becomes coherent when theories of reference and meaning are separated from broader questions about communication, social practice and cognition.
Compare descriptive, causal and direct-reference accounts of how names and terms pick out things in the world.
Study whether understanding a sentence is primarily knowing the conditions under which it would be true.
Examine how context, convention and conversational inference contribute content beyond literal sentence meaning.
Treat utterances as actions such as asserting, promising, commanding and naming, governed by social and institutional conditions.
Ask how linguistic meaning relates to mental representation, translation and the possibility of understanding radically different speakers.
reference ≠ meaning
sentence meaning ≠ speaker meaning
use ≠ arbitrary interpretation
Can two expressions refer to the same object while differing in cognitive significance?
How much meaning is fixed by social practice rather than individual intention?
What must be shared for interpretation across languages to succeed?
Arguments should distinguish semantic, pragmatic and psychological claims; empirical claims about processing or language acquisition need independent linguistic and cognitive evidence.