What outcome is wanted?
Price, scope, timing, quality and risk are distinct dimensions even when one number dominates discussion.
Side 104
Negotiation
A study of bargaining under interdependence. Negotiation separates positions from interests, estimates alternatives and zones of possible agreement, manages information, and designs commitments that still work after the conversation ends.
interests→alternatives→range→exchange→agreement
06study lenses
36working concepts
V0working model
104Side
Positions are demands; interests explain why the demand matters.
The more accurately interests are mapped, the more possible trades become visible.
How must the negotiation feel or function?
Voice, transparency and pace affect acceptance independently of material terms.
What future interaction matters?
A one-shot bargain and a repeated relationship justify different tactics.
What must each side be able to defend?
Status and face can block agreements that are economically attractive.
What cannot be stated easily?
Internal politics, constraints and precedent often shape positions indirectly.
Which interests are tradable?
Ranked priorities create room for logrolling across issues.
Leverage begins outside the negotiation.
A strong alternative reduces dependence and clarifies the point at which no deal is better.
Best alternative to agreement.
The BATNA is an actual path, not a threat or optimistic aspiration.
Worst acceptable deal.
This boundary should be set before pressure and sunk costs accumulate.
Negotiate with the market too.
Creating another supplier, buyer, role or option can matter more than persuasive technique.
What happens if the other side walks?
Their alternatives constrain the offers they can rationally accept.
How expensive is exit?
Contracts, delay, reputation and search effort change the practical value of alternatives.
Deadlines alter alternative value.
Urgency can be leverage when it is asymmetric.
Negotiation is partly an information problem.
Each side decides what to reveal, infer, test and protect.
Ask for structure, not confession.
Open questions about priorities and constraints reveal more than demands for bottom lines.
Behavior contains evidence.
Concessions, silence, deadlines and issue emphasis can reveal preferences but remain noisy.
First numbers shape the bargaining field.
An anchor is strongest when it is credible and justified, not merely extreme.
One side may know more.
Warranties, contingencies and verification can convert hidden information into contract terms.
Misrepresentation has costs.
Short-term gains can destroy trust, trigger retaliation or create legal exposure.
Claims need tests.
Objective standards reduce conflict over facts that neither side should have to negotiate.
Bargaining distributes value after the possibility of agreement exists.
The zone of possible agreement is shaped by alternatives, expectations and issue structure.
Where can both sides do better than walking?
No amount of technique creates a deal when reservation ranges do not overlap unless the deal structure changes.
Move deliberately, not automatically.
Pattern and size communicate information about remaining flexibility.
Trade across multiple issues.
Packages make it harder to fight over one dimension and easier to exploit different preferences.
Use external criteria.
Market data, precedent and objective benchmarks can depersonalize distributive conflict.
Dependence shapes bargaining strength.
Power comes from alternatives, time, information, legitimacy and the ability to impose cost.
Deadlock can be rational.
Pausing, changing representation or restructuring issues may be better than forcing agreement.
A negotiated yes is not yet a functioning agreement.
Implementation quality depends on specificity, incentives and mechanisms for uncertainty.
Define obligations precisely.
Ambiguity postponed from the meeting becomes conflict during execution.
Let terms vary with future states.
Earn-outs, options and indexation can bridge disagreement about uncertain outcomes.
Decide how later decisions will be made.
Escalation paths and review rules prevent every new issue from reopening the whole bargain.
Specify how performance is measured.
Metrics, inspection rights and data access reduce factual disputes.
Plan for failure.
Exit, cure periods and dispute resolution matter most when trust is under stress.
Test incentives after signing.
A deal that requires one side to behave against its incentives will deteriorate.
Negotiation improves through preparation and review.
Separate the quality of the process from whether a single outcome happened to be favorable.
Write interests, alternatives and limits.
Externalizing the model reduces improvisational drift.
Test the other side's strongest case.
Arguing their position reveals hidden assumptions in your own.
Use silence and breaks deliberately.
Time lowers reactivity and allows calculations to catch up with pressure.
Track offers and movement.
A simple log prevents memory from rewriting the negotiation.
Compare prediction with behavior.
What did the other side value more or less than expected?
Carry learning forward.
A post-negotiation model should improve the next preparation, not merely explain the past.