What are we committed to?
Object, property, relation, number?
Ordinary and scientific language can carry hidden ontological commitments.
Side 92
A study of the most general structure of reality. Metaphysics asks what exists, what kinds of things exist, how they depend on one another, what makes them persist, and what it means for something to be possible or necessary.
The difficulty begins immediately because objects, properties, numbers, events, relations and possibilities do not all seem to exist in the same way.
Object, property, relation, number?
Ordinary and scientific language can carry hidden ontological commitments.
Causal role, quantification, indispensability?
Different ontologies use different standards for admission.
Substance, event, process, property?
Classification changes what questions can be asked about persistence and causation.
Fundamental or derivative?
Some entities may exist only because others do.
Do not multiply entities lightly.
Explanatory gain must justify additional kinds of being.
Metaphysical theories disagree about whether the world is fundamentally made of substances, events, processes, relations, structures or something else.
Ordinary ontology treats tables, trees and people as persistent individuals.
Redness, mass and fragility raise questions about universals versus particular instances.
Distance, similarity and dependence may be as fundamental as individual things.
Events provide one ontology for causation and change.
Process views treat persistence as ongoing activity rather than static substance.
Structural realism asks whether structure may be more fundamental than individual objects.
The problem is distinguishing change in a thing from replacement by a different thing.
| Problem | Question | Pressure point |
|---|---|---|
| Persistence | How does one thing exist across time? | Change of parts and properties |
| Composition | When do parts form one object? | Arbitrary groupings versus genuine wholes |
| Vagueness | Where do object boundaries begin and end? | Clouds, organisms, heaps |
| Ship of Theseus | Can all parts change while identity remains? | Material versus structural continuity |
| Coincidence | Can two objects occupy the same place? | Statue versus lump of clay |
Dependence relations ask what is fundamental and what exists or holds in virtue of something else.
Causal dependence unfolds through events or mechanisms.
A molecule depends on its constituents in a different way from an effect depending on a cause.
Grounding is proposed as a noncausal relation of metaphysical explanation.
Supervenience expresses dependence without specifying the mechanism.
The metaphysical question is whether emergence is merely explanatory or ontologically novel.
Modality distinguishes what is actual from what is possible, necessary or impossible.
Possibility is broader than what actually happens.
Logical, metaphysical and physical necessity may differ.
Counterfactual reasoning links modality to causation and explanation.
Essence connects identity with modal structure.
Possible-world semantics provides a formal language for modal claims.
Laws of nature constrain physical possibility without exhausting metaphysical possibility.
Science often reveals levels beneath ordinary objects; metaphysics asks what that reduction does and does not imply.
Start with persons, tables, organisms and institutions as apparently real entities.
Analyze them into cells, molecules, particles, fields or structures.
Ask whether higher-level entities are identical with, realized by or grounded in lower-level facts.
Ask whether higher-level explanations remain genuinely informative.
Ask whether the search for a final basic level is coherent or necessary.