What decision actually exists?
Define scope, horizon and objective.
A badly framed problem can make every later calculation precise but irrelevant.
Side 12
A study of choosing when outcomes are uncertain, objectives compete and information is incomplete. The aim is not to eliminate judgment, but to make assumptions, trade-offs and updating more inspectable.
A good decision can produce a bad outcome because uncertainty remains after the choice. Judge the process by what was knowable at the time, then use the outcome as new evidence.
Define scope, horizon and objective.
A badly framed problem can make every later calculation precise but irrelevant.
Include delay, experiment and no-action.
Option generation should happen before option evaluation to avoid premature narrowing.
States, probabilities and missing information.
Distinguish uncertainty that can be reduced from uncertainty that must simply be carried.
Outcomes need weights.
Money, time, reversibility, learning, downside and strategic position may all matter simultaneously.
Outcome ≠ verdict.
Compare result with expectation, revise beliefs and improve the next decision rule.
Expected value is a starting point, not a complete theory of choice. Risk attitude, irreversibility, tail losses and information value can change the preferred action.
Useful when repeated exposure, linear value and manageable downside make averages decision-relevant.
The same monetary gain or loss can matter differently depending on wealth, objectives and risk tolerance.
Reversible choices often deserve faster experimentation; irreversible choices justify more information and stronger safeguards.
An action can be valuable partly because it keeps multiple future paths open.
Information is worth acquiring when its expected effect on decisions exceeds its acquisition cost.
Regret-based reasoning focuses on how painful it would be to learn that another option would have performed better.
The goal is not certainty. It is probabilities that become meaningful over repeated judgments and can be updated as evidence arrives.
Ask how often similar situations produce the outcome before focusing on unique details.
Forecast component events or drivers when the whole question is too opaque.
Track whether stated confidence corresponds to observed frequency across many forecasts.
New information should change belief in proportion to its diagnostic value, not its vividness.
Ambiguous resolution criteria make later scoring meaningless.
Forecasting improves when predictions are recorded, dated and later scored against a clear outcome.
Heuristics reduce cognitive cost. The same shortcuts that enable rapid judgment can also create predictable distortions under the wrong conditions.
Vivid or recent examples can overweight perceived frequency.
An arbitrary or weakly relevant starting point can influence later judgments.
Reference points affect how equivalent changes are psychologically valued.
Evidence consistent with an existing belief may receive more attention or less scrutiny.
Irrecoverable expenditure is allowed to justify continued investment even when future prospects have changed.
Known outcomes can make a previously uncertain decision look obviously wise or foolish.
The useful question is whether a decision process contains conditions known to produce a distortion, not whether another person can be casually diagnosed with a named bias.
Game theory studies interdependent decisions: each actor’s best move can depend on what others do, know and expect.
| Game structure | Central tension | Useful question | Common setting |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prisoner’s dilemma | Individual incentive can undermine joint welfare. | What supports cooperation? | Repeated cooperation, arms races, shared resources. |
| Coordination game | Multiple compatible outcomes may exist. | How do expectations converge? | Standards, conventions, platform adoption. |
| Chicken | Each side wants the other to yield. | How credible is commitment? | Bargaining and escalation. |
| Zero-sum | One side’s gain equals the other’s loss. | Which strategy is robust against an opponent? | Some competitive contests and games. |
| Principal–agent | Delegation + asymmetric information. | How can incentives align behavior? | Employment, contracting, governance. |
Use compact scenarios to separate beliefs, values and action thresholds.
Do not ask only whether 40% sounds low. Estimate the upside, downside, learning value, cost of delay and whether a small pilot can cheaply resolve uncertainty.
Separate the economic value of the discount from the decision-pressure effect of the deadline. Ask whether the offer changes the underlying expected value or merely compresses your review time.
Do not let outcome streaks replace process evaluation. Ask how many alternative strategies could have produced similar results, what base rate applies and what evidence would falsify the current rule.
Estimate value of information: how likely is research to change the chosen option, and how large is the difference in value between the options it might switch you between?