What happened?
Candidate cause and outcome.
Causal claims require clear events, states or variables.
Side 94
A study of what it means for one thing to make a difference to another. Unlike Causal Inference, which asks how effects can be estimated from evidence, Causation asks what causal relations themselves are.
That intuitive idea becomes difficult once multiple causes, prevention, omission and preemption enter the picture.
Candidate cause and outcome.
Causal claims require clear events, states or variables.
Dependence.
Difference-making captures why causes matter rather than merely precede.
Mechanism or process.
Mechanistic accounts explain what links cause and effect.
Manipulability.
Intervention formalizes causal control while distinguishing it from observation.
Causes are rarely sufficient alone.
Causal status often depends on a surrounding structure of enabling conditions.
A causes B when, under the relevant alternative where A does not occur, B would not occur—or would occur differently.
The observed sequence alone does not establish the causal relation.
The comparison should preserve relevant background conditions.
This difference provides the core counterfactual relation.
Counterfactual truth depends on how alternatives are selected.
A backup cause can make B occur even if the actual cause were absent.
Simple but-for dependence can miss genuine causal contribution.
Causation becomes intelligible when entities and activities connect initial conditions to outcomes through an organized process.
Molecules, cells, people, institutions or components can occupy mechanistic roles.
Binding, transmitting, signaling or deciding are process elements.
The same parts can produce different outcomes under different organization.
Manipulation helps test whether a proposed mechanism is causally relevant.
Mechanisms can be decomposed further without making higher-level explanation useless.
If changing X while breaking its usual causes changes Y, X occupies a causal role in the modeled system.
| Relationship | Observation | Intervention | Causal implication |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correlation | X and Y vary together | Unknown | Insufficient alone |
| Common cause | X predicts Y | Changing X may not change Y | Association can be spurious |
| Mediation | X relates to M and Y | Changing pathway alters Y | Mechanism becomes testable |
| Direct effect | X predicts Y after controls | Manipulating X changes Y | Supports causal role |
| Feedback | X and Y influence each other | Direction-specific intervention needed | Causal structure is cyclic |
Powers and dispositions describe entities as having capacities that can manifest under suitable conditions.
An object can possess a causal disposition even when it never manifests.
Powers views treat causal potential as part of what entities are.
Law-based theories connect causation to nomological patterns.
Humean views resist adding hidden necessary connections beyond patterns.
Production language captures something ordinary dependence accounts can feel too thin to express.
A cause may increase the probability of an outcome without guaranteeing it.
A mature theory must handle omission, prevention, redundancy and causal chains without counting every correlation as causal.
One cause produces the outcome before a backup cause can do so.
Several independent causes are each sufficient for the same outcome.
Failure to act can appear causally relevant despite no positive event occurring.
A cause can produce the non-occurrence of another event.
A cause changes chances without determining the result.